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THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE
ACCURACY OF BREATH TEST
RESULTS UNDER ALASKA LAW
PAUL A. CLARK
ABSTRACT
Section 28.90.020 of the Alaska Statutes provides that in prosecutions for
drunk driving, “if an offense described under this title requires that a
chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular result, and the
chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by
the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is not affected
by the instrument’s working tolerance.” This provision appears to prohibit
the defense from calling into question the accuracy of a breath test by
introducing evidence of uncertainty inherent in the testing procedure. The
statute is problematic because due process requires that defendants be
permitted to challenge the evidence presented against them. Moreover, there
is a strong argument that basing conviction on a single breath sample that is
within a known margin of error is a per se violation of due process, as it bases
guilt or innocence on a purely fortuitous result. This Article examines the
issues with Alaska’s statute and proposes using multiple breath tests as a
simple, cost-effective solution to this potential abuse of due process.

INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical trial testimony by a properly
qualified expert witness in a drunk-driving case. The uncontested
evidence which has been presented from video surveillance in the bar
where the defendant was drinking and the testimony of the bar tender
and twenty witnesses prove that she drank exactly four bottles of
Alaskan Amber beer. Based on the defendant’s size and the quantity of
alcohol, her blood alcohol level could not possibly have been higher
than .070 percent. Even though her breath test sample result was an
apparent .080, due to the inherent uncertainty in such testing, the
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apparent result is within the margin of error for the instrument used,
and does not contradict a legal blood or breath alcohol level.
Unfortunately for our hypothetical defendant, this defense may not
be allowed. While Alaska’s driving under the influence (“DUI”) statute
says that defendants may introduce evidence of the amount of alcohol
consumed in order to rebut the apparent results of the breath sample,1
section 28.90.020 of the Alaska Statutes (the “working tolerance” statute)
ostensibly prevents defendants from introducing evidence of inherent
uncertainty in the breath testing procedure.2 Accordingly, our
hypothetical defendant could present evidence that she drank only four
beers and that she could not have been higher than .070, but could not
present the explanation reconciling the discrepancy: namely, that an
apparent result of .080 actually represents a range of possible breath
alcohol levels.
This paper argues that the Alaska and United States Constitutions
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to introduce exculpatory
evidence, and therefore a defendant cannot be prevented by statute from
presenting a defense based on the margin of error.3 As one leading
scholar has summarized it, “The Court has rigorously enforced the
accused’s constitutional right and strictly scrutinized exclusionary rules
that block the admission of important defense evidence.”4 Moreover,
due process likely requires that known uncertainties in the measuring
process be assumed in favor of a criminal defendant.
Alaska courts have generally held statutes unconstitutional when
1. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(s) (2012) (“In a prosecution under (a) of this
section, a person may introduce evidence on the amount of alcohol consumed
before or after operating or driving the motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft to
rebut or explain the results of a chemical test.”).
2. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.90.020(a) (2012) (“[I]f an offense described under
this title requires that a chemical test of a person's breath produce a particular
result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument
approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is
not affected by the instrument's working tolerance.”). The terms “margin of
error,” “working tolerance,” and “inherent uncertainty” are used
interchangeably by the courts.
3. Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 325 (Alaska 2009) (“Under the United
States and Alaska Constitutions, a defendant has the right to present relevant
exculpatory evidence in a criminal trial.”); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547
U.S. 319, 324 (2006) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses
of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”) (quoting Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a
complete discussion of the parameters of this right, see infra Section VII.
4. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT FAVORABLE
EVIDENCE 79 (3d. ed. 2004).
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they restrict a defendant’s ability to present a defense.5 For example, in
State v. Murtagh,6 the Alaska Supreme Court considered the validity of a
statute that placed a variety of restrictions on criminal defendants
seeking to interview witnesses in sexual offense cases (while not placing
the same restrictions on the prosecution).7 Statements taken without
following these procedures were presumptively inadmissible.8 The court
held these provisions to be unconstitutional violations of due process.9
The court went on to note that “the court’s responsibility concerning fair
trial rights does not mean that the legislature is powerless to act in the
area. But our responsibility requires that statutes that are claimed to
infringe fair trial rights be closely scrutinized.”10
Furthermore, “conclusive presumptions” are forbidden in criminal
cases.11 “Permissive presumptions” are permitted so long as the jury is
informed that it may but need not conclude that proof of one fact
establishes the proof of the second fact, and that such a “permissive
inference” in no way relieves the state of the burden to prove each
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.12 Whatever the
“working tolerance” statute may mean, however, it cannot establish a
conclusive presumption, nor can it shift the burden of proof to a
defendant with respect to an element of the offense.

I. DEFINING THE CRIME OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
In Alaska it is a crime to knowingly operate a vehicle with a breath
alcohol level of at least .080 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, or a
blood alcohol level of .08% or more.13 Under the “blood-alcohol-level
theory” of drunk driving (sometimes referred to as the per se theory),
the state can convict a person of drunk driving regardless of actual
impairment as long as it has chemical tests proving excessive blood or
breath alcohol content.14 In addition to the per se theory, a person can be
5. See, e.g., Valentine, 215 P.3d at 325 (holding that excluding “delayedabsorption evidence in prosecutions . . . that rely on chemical test results violates
the defendant's right to due process”).
6. 169 P.3d 602 (Alaska 2007).
7. Id. at 605.
8. Id. at 606.
9. Id. at 624.
10. Id. at 609.
11. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523–24 (1979).
12. Id. at 524 (“Because [defendant’s] jury may have interpreted the judge’s
instruction as constituting either a burden-shifting presumption . . . or a
conclusive presumption . . . we hold the instruction given in this case
unconstitutional.”).
13. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (2012).
14. Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 319 (Alaska 2009). This is referred to as
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convicted under the “impairment theory,” under which the state can
show impairment of driving ability.15
The phrase “as determined by a chemical test,” which is typically
lifted and placed in a jury instruction,16 is confusing to many jurors (and
perhaps even to some courts). For example, in City of Seattle v. Gellein,17 a
Washington trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution had to
prove that the defendant was driving and that “at the time he had 0.10
percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical
analysis of his breath.”18 The jury was unsure what to make of this
language and sent a note to the judge asking: “Are we to believe that the
breathalyzer test is infallible and accurate? So, if the breathalyzer is .16
then the defendant is guilty because the defendant is driving while he
has over .10 percent in his blood stream.”19 The judge gave no clarifying
instruction, and the jury found the defendant guilty.20 The Washington
Supreme Court overturned the verdict because the jury may have
understood the instruction to require them to accept the apparent breath
test result as accurate.21
In fact, there are many reasons that a breathalyzer reading may be
inaccurate, including equipment malfunction or operator error. In June
of 2010, The Washington Post reported that hundreds of defendants in the
District of Columbia were wrongfully convicted of DUI because “[t]he
District’s badly calibrated equipment would show a driver’s bloodalcohol content to be about 20 percent higher than it actually was.”22
the “blood-alcohol-level theory” even when it is usually breath alcohol that is
tested. Id.
15. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(1) (2012). See Conrad v. State, 54 P.3d 313
(noting that defendant was tried under the “impairment theory,” which is
codified in ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(1)).
16. See CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE, ALASKA CRIMINAL
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2012), available at http://www.courts.alaska.gov/
crimins.htm (giving examples of jury instructions).
17. 768 P.2d 470 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
18. Id. at 470. This is the language of WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (1981),
which provided that a person was guilty of drunk driving if he drove while
“[h]e ha[d] a 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by
chemical analysis of this breath, blood, or other bodily substance.”
19. Id. at 471.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 472 (holding that the instruction was “susceptible to
misinterpretation by a reasonable jury as an unconstitutional mandatory
presumption”).
22. Mary Pat Flaherty, 400 Drunken-Driving Convictions in D.C. Based on
Flawed Test, Official Says, THE WASH. POST (June 10, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/
AR2010060906257.html. In March 2011, the Philadelphia Inquirer discovered the
same problem. See Dana Difilippo, City Fails Breathalyzer Test in 1,100 Cases,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 24, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-03-
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Even when a breathalyzer is properly calibrated, the subject sample
may not accurately reflect the person’s level of sobriety. Most states
require two breath samples,23 and it is common for a person to blow into
the breathalyzer twice and obtain one result above .08 and another result
below .08.24
These deviations are well-known in the scientific literature on
breath testing.25 But two states (Alaska and Delaware) have statutes that
appear to forbid introduction of margin of error evidence.26 For years,
Alaska law required that any inherent uncertainty in the breath or blood
reading be applied in favor of the defendant,27 but in 1996 the legislature
passed a statute declaring that margin of error evidence in blood-alcohol
theory cases was inadmissible.28 The court of appeals in Mangiapane v.
Municipality of Anchorage29 then held that this statute “effectively
declares that a driver violates AS 28.35.030(a)(2) if . . . the driver’s test
result is at least .10 percent blood-alcohol or the equivalent .10 grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.”30 In other words, the test result itself
was the element of the offense rather than evidence of the offense. The
accuracy of the test seems to become irrelevant under this theory.
Within three years, the court of appeals reversed course and
clarified that the test only created a presumption of blood or breath
alcohol content at the time of offense, and was not itself the element that
needed to be proved.31 However, Alaska courts have not gone back to
24/news/29181749_1_dui-cases-breathalyzer-machines-hundreds-of-drunkdrivers (finding that four breathalyzer machines were improperly calibrated).
23. See infra Section VIII.
24. See, e.g., State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Taylor-Caldwell, 229 P.3d 471,
471 (Nev. 2010) (registering consecutive breath tests at 0.073 and 0.083); Jaffray v.
State, 702 S.E.2d 742, 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (registering both a 0.085 and a
0.073); Gillham v. County of Lake, No. A124084, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
4351, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (registering three tests, the first negative, the
second .08, and the third .07).
25. See generally R.G. Gullberg, Duplicate Breath Testing: Some Statistical
Analyses, 36 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 205 (1988) (encouraging duplicate breath testing
to increase sample size and improve accuracy).
26. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177 (2012)
(“In any proceeding, the resulting alcohol or drug concentration when a test, as
defined in subsection (c)(2) of this section, is performed shall be deemed to be
the actual alcohol or drug concentration in the person’s blood breath or urine
without regard to any margin of error or tolerance factor inherent in such
tests.”).
27. Barcott v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 741 P.2d
226, 228 (Alaska 1987) (“[D]ue process requires consideration of the margin of
error inherent in the breath testing procedure . . . .”).
28. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a) (1997).
29. 974 P.2d 427 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
30. Id. at 430.
31. Conrad v. State, 54 P.3d 313, 314–15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (“We find no
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the requirement that uncertainty must be assumed to benefit the
defendant. A defendant cannot challenge the accuracy of the test “as
long as a breath test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument
approved by the Department of Public Safety.”32
This line of cases has resulted in considerable confusion as to the
elements of DUI. This Article argues that a breath test result should be
evidence of a person’s breath alcohol concentration rather than an element
of the offense. The court of appeals in Mangiapane held that a positive
test result was an element of the offense,33 but succeeding cases have
distinguished Mangiapane‘s holding.34 Alaska’s courts should recognize
that due process permits a defendant to introduce evidence that the
breath test is inaccurate, and any margin of error must be credited to a
criminal defendant.

II. THE TESTING PROCEDURE: WHY IS THERE UNCERTAINTY?
The breathalyzer measures the amount of alcohol in the breath.
The test results reported by the breathalyzer corresponds to bloodalcohol percentages by assuming a blood-alcohol to breath-alcohol ratio
of 2100 to 1.35 When alcohol passes into the lungs through the
bloodstream, it mixes with the inhaled air in the alveoli.36 The scientific
validity of a breathalyzer test result depends on testing this alveolar
breath.37
The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed the scientific validity of the
test by holding that a “breathalyzer result was presumptively admissible
if the municipality established, as a foundational matter, that the
analysis of [the defendant’s] breath was performed according to
methods approved by the Alaska Department of Health and Social
Services.”38 However, the presumption of admissibility is not

indication that the Alaska Legislature . . . intended to shift the focus away from
the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of driving and to make the test
result determinative of the defendant’s guilt.”), superseded by statute, Act effective
July 1, 2004, §§ 25, 27, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, as recognized in Valentine
v. State, 215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009).
32. Hooton v. State, No. A–9435, 2009 WL 1259360, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 6, 2009).
33. 974 P.2d at 430 (basing violation on test result, not “true” blood alcohol
level).
34. See infra Section VI.
35. Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 378 (Alaska 1976).
36. State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 127 (N.J. 2008).
37. See id. (“Breath testing therefore uses an indirect measure of BAC by
calculating the alcohol concentration in the breath . . . .”).
38. Thayer v. Municipality of Anchorage, 686 P.2d 721, 726 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984).
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irrebuttable, and the court must ask whether the procedures for testing
breath comply with the manufacturer’s specifications for proper use.39
The case of Guerre-Chaley v. State40 is a good illustration of this
point. When he was arrested, Guerre-Chaley was given a preliminary
breath test administered by a handheld device carried by police. The
result of the preliminary test showed his breath alcohol content at 0.079
grams per 210 liters of breath.41 Guerre-Chaley took another breath test
at the police station, where the test gave a breath alcohol reading of
0.091.42 At trial, Guerre-Chaley wished to introduce evidence of the
preliminary breath test to contradict the results of the second test.43 The
Court ruled that the preliminary result was inadmissible because
Guerre-Chaley had failed to present any evidence that the test was
scientifically valid under Alaska procedural standards.44 The same
objection could be leveled against any testing device or testing
procedure; a foundation must be laid that the proposed scientific
evidence meets procedural standards for admissibility.
A breath test is only scientifically valid if the instrument is
functioning properly. Alaska has attempted to assure accuracy by
adopting regulations prescribing the method for administering breath
tests.45 For the results of a test to be admissible, the state must show
“substantial compliance” with these regulations.46 With respect to the
“Datamaster,” one important control is the use of a known quantity of
an external source of alcohol (sometimes referred to as an “Alco bottle”),
which is tested by the breathalyzer to determine accuracy.47 Before and

39. Id. at 727.
40. 88 P.3d 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
41. Id. at 541.
42. Id. Afterward, Guerre-Chaley requested an actual blood test, which put
his blood alcohol content at 0.095 percent. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 63.040 (2012).
46. Thayer v. Municipality of Anchorage, 686 P.2d 721, 727 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984).
47. See generally ALASKA SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION LABORATORY, BREATH
ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM MANUAL 27 (2013) [hereinafter BREATH ALCOHOL
TESTING MANUAL] (describing the process of developing external standards); see
also Ashenfelter v. State, No. 5920, 2013 WL 563182, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb.
13, 2013) (memorandum opinion) (describing how Alco bottles are used to verify
breathalyzer accuracy); James Halpin, Calibration Error Puts DUI Test in Question,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 29, 2010), http://www.adn.com/2010/07
/29/1387533/calibration-error-puts-bac-tests.html (“The tanks contain a known
sample of alcohol that the instrument measures before and after every test to
ensure it is functioning properly.”). The Datamaster is “the only approved
evidential breath test instrument in the State of Alaska.” BREATH ALCOHOL
TESTING MANUAL at 10.

CLARK_V10.1[FINAL] (DO NOT DELETE)

8

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

4/14/2013 4:54 PM

Vol. 30:1

after each person blows into a Datamaster, the instrument takes a
sample from the Alco bottle and analyzes it.48 If the actual results are
within a certain range of the target value, the breathalyzer is considered
sufficiently accurate.49
Assuming the instrument is functioning properly, there are several
sources of inaccuracy which may affect any individual reading. First, the
measuring instrument itself is subject to a margin of error. According to
the Alaska Breath Alcohol Testing Program Manual, “there exists an
inherent uncertainty in the Datamaster-Alco breath testing system such
that the sample analyzed may be considered to be accurate to within +/.005 g/210L.”50 If one repeatedly uses a breathalyzer to analyze the exact
same homogeneous gas/alcohol mixture in a controlled environment,
the instrument will register different results due to the margin of error
or inherent uncertainty. Because all measuring devices have a margin of
error, this factor is present in every single breath test.
A second source of uncertainty is calibration. Improper calibration
can yield further error, and even a properly calibrated instrument will
drift away from accuracy over time.
A third source of uncertainty is from the breath sample itself. A
particular breath sample may not reflect a person’s level of sobriety for a
variety of reasons. If a subject gargles alcohol-based mouthwash, then
spits it out and blows into a breathalyzer, the instrument may register a
high level of alcohol content in the breath. The machine may well
indicate the subject is legally drunk, when obviously he is completely
sober. Contaminated breath samples are such a well-known problem
that Alaska regulations require a fifteen minute waiting period to ensure
that the subject can be observed to ensure there is no regurgitation of
alcohol into the throat or mouth.51 As noted above, a breath test is
supposed to be testing alveolar air from the lungs; if the instrument is
measuring something other than alveolar air (like mouth alcohol), then
the test is invalid.
Even without mouth alcohol present, a subject can blow into a
functioning breath test instrument ten times and get ten different subject
48. Ashenfelter, 2013 WL 563182, at *3.
49. Id.
50. SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION LABORATORY, STATE OF ALASKA, ALASKA
BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM MANUAL, 3–17 (2008). In 2013, the
Department of Public Safety issued a revised, considerably shorter Alaska
Breath Alcohol Testing Program Manual which appears to omit discussion of
inherent uncertainty in the sample analyzed; however, it does note that “[t]he
allowable range for the external standard is +/- 0.005 from the target value
adjusted for barometric pressure.” BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING MANUAL, supra
note 47, at 27.
51. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 63.040(a)(1) (2012).
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readings. The reason for this is that the amount of alcohol absorbed from
the lungs varies from breath to breath based on a wide variety of factors.
The alcohol concentration varies in the course of even a single
exhalation. In fact, over the course of a single exhalation sample, the
Datamaster analyzes the alcohol content four times each second (for
perhaps as many as 100 individual measurements), and the instrument’s
software uses this information to estimate a final result.52 In any event,
even assuming a perfectly functioning measuring instrument, a person’s
breath alcohol content is a constantly fluctuating target. A good
example of this variability comes from a recent case before the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. Minnesota uses a system of two breath
samples with each breath tested twice, and the lowest of the four test
results counted as the basis for a charge.53 The Court explains:
The reading from the first sample was .131, with a replicate
reading of .132, and the reading from the second sample was
.119, with a replicate reading of .121. Officer Tamm testified
that variation in the readings is common and expected, that no
errors occurred in running the test, and that the machine
functioned properly.54
Variations in the test results of the same breath sample is due to the
margin of error of the testing instrument, while the larger difference
between the two breath samples is likely the result of the different
alcohol content in subsequent breaths. So a person can have a .080
breath alcohol content and soon after have a .070.55 This is a factor which
will be a source of uncertainty in every breath test.
52. A graph of each individual breath measurement in the course of a single
breath will present a curve with an initial steep incline then leveling off or
declining. In theory if the instrument is testing mouth alcohol then the curve will
be a downward slope instead of a plateau, and the Datamaster should register
an error; but frequently the instrument cannot distinguish between mouth and
lung alcohol. See C. Dennis Simpson et al., Effects of Mouth Alcohol on Breath
Alcohol Results, 3 INT’L J. OF DRUG TESTING 1, 10 (2004) (showing that in laboratory
tests the Datamaster correctly gave an error message for mouth alcohol only 52%
of the time).
53. State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. App. Ct. 2012).
54. Id. at 688. While the body is constantly absorbing or eliminating alcohol
from the blood, these replicate tests occur within a few minutes of each other, so
elimination of alcohol could not account for such a large disparity in replicate
breath tests. See State v. Lowe, 740 A.2d 348, 350 (Vt. 1999) (noting that when
two test conducted minutes apart yield different values the source is likely the
margin of error in testing rather than elimination of alcohol).
55. See, e.g., State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Taylor-Caldwell, 229 P.3d 471,
471 (Nev. 2010) (registering consecutive breath tests at 0.073 and 0.083); Lowe,
740 A.2d at 350 (noting test results of .083 and .079); Thompson v. State, Dep’t of
Licensing, 960 P.2d 475, 477 (1998) ("The results of the two breath tests revealed
concentrations of .08 and .07.").
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None of these sources of uncertainty are news. Courts around the
country have dealt with these issues for years. Legislatures have often
responded by redefining the crime of DUI in a way that avoids the
margin of error problem. These redefinitions have often resulted in
convoluted DUI statutes, as we will see in the following section.

III. THE ELEMENTS OF DUI—WHAT DOES THE STATE HAVE TO
PROVE?
Section 28.35.030 of the Alaska Statutes makes it a crime to be in
control of a vehicle “if, as determined by a chemical test taken within
four hours after the alleged operating or driving, there is 0.08 percent or
more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or if there is 0.08 grams
or more of alcohol per 210 liters of the person’s breath.”56 There are two
ambiguities present in this formulation. First, when is the test result
relevant: at the time of driving, or at the time of testing? And second,
does the phrase “as determined by” make the test results unassailable?
The statute provides for an offense when “there is 0.08 percent or
more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood” within four hours. This
strongly suggests that the State must prove an actual breath or blood
alcohol level used as the basis for the offense.
That the test result is not the element of the offense is more obvious
from other parts of the statute. Section 28.35.030(s) provides: “In a
prosecution under (a) of this section, a person may introduce evidence
on the amount of alcohol consumed before or after operating or driving
the motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft to rebut or explain the results of
a chemical test . . . .”57
Obviously, if the test itself were an element of the offense there
would be no rebuttal. Yet under subsection (s), a person can testify, “I
may have had a subject sample of .150, but that can’t possibly be
accurate because I had only one glass of wine.” Thus, subsection (s),
when read in conjunction with subsection (a), shows that subsection (a)
cannot be read to make the test result the element of the offense. The test
result is evidence that can be rebutted by contradictory evidence.
It should also be noted that a number of states use (or at one point
used) “as determined by” language in their DUI statutes. Alabama,
Arkansas, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Washington, and Virginia all have similar language to Alaska’s
“as determined by a chemical test” provision.58 Each of these states has
56. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (2012).
57. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(s) (2012).
58. ALA. CODE § 32-5A-194 (2012) (“[E]vidence of the amount of alcohol or
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held, however, that this language does not make the test result an
element of the offense, and that a defendant still has the right to present
evidence challenging the apparent test results.59 As the Virginia Court of
controlled substance in a person's blood at the alleged time, as determined by a
chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance,
shall be admissible.”); ARK. STAT. 5-65-103(b) (2000) (making it a crime to drive
when “there was one tenth of one percent (0.10%) or more by weight of alcohol
in the person’s blood as determined by a chemical test”); MINN. STAT. § 169A.20
(2012) (“[It is a crime for a person to operate a vehicle when] the person’s alcohol
concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of
driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or
more.”); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 2013) (“The following effect
shall be given to evidence of blood-alcohol content, as determined by such tests,
of a person arrested for violation of . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE 4511.19(D)(1)(b) (“In
any criminal prosecution . . .the court may admit evidence on the concentration
of alcohol, … at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis
of the substance”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 813.010 (West 2012) (“[A person is
committing a DUI if he h]as 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the
blood of the person as shown by chemical analysis of the breath or blood of the
person . . . .”); R.I. GEN. LAW. § 31-27-2(b)(1) ("Any person charged under
subsection (a) of this section whose blood alcohol concentration is eight onehundredths of one percent (.08%) or more by weight as shown by a chemical
analysis of a blood, breath, or urine sample shall be guilty of violating
subsection (a) of this section.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-1 (2012) (“No person
may drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while . . . [t]here is 0.08
percent or more by weight of alcohol in that person's blood as shown by
chemical analysis of that person's breath, blood, or other bodily substance.”);
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (2012) (“[A person is guilty of DUI if] the person
has, within two hours after driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher as
shown by analysis of the person's breath . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2012)
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle,
engine or train . . . while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08
percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of
breath as indicated by a chemical test administered as provided in this article . . .
.”).
59. Goodwin v. State, 728 So.2d 662, 668 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (explaining
that the statute creates no more than a presumption of intoxication); Jones v.
State, 2011 Ark. App. 403, 404 n.1 (Ark. App. 2011) (explaining that elimination
of the phrase “as determined by a chemical test” in the statute was not a
substantive change in the law); State v. Birk, 687 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. App.
2004) (explaining that test result does not create a presumption and jury may
refuse to accept test results); People v. Mertz, 497 N.E. 2d 657, 600-63) (N.Y.
1986); State v. West, 279 P.3d 354 (Or. App. 2012) (“[T]he amount of alcohol in a
person's blood at the time the person is alleged to have been driving a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, as shown by chemical analysis
of the person's breath or blood, is indirect evidence that may be used at trial,
along with other evidence, to determine whether the person was in fact under
the influence of intoxicants.”); State v. Ensey, 881 A.2d 81, 88 (R.I. 2005) (“Once a
trial justice determines that particular breathalyzer test results are admissible
and those results are admitted, a defendant may offer competent evidence to
rebut the inference that the test result was accurate.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAW 32-237 specifies that a chemical test gives rise to a presumption (“In any criminal
prosecution for . . . a violation of § 22-16-41, the amount of alcohol in the
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Appeals explained in Davis v. Commonwealth,60 the testing measurement
“is an evidentiary fact which creates a rebuttable presumption that the
measurement accurately reflects the blood alcohol concentration at the
time of driving.”61
The Ohio statute is similar to Alaska’s in that Ohio defines the
offence in 4511.19(A)(1) making it a crime to drive a vehicle “under the
influence of alcohol” or with a blood alcohol level of .080 or more. Then
in 4511.19(D)(1)(b) the Ohio statute goes on to provide that a court may
admit evidence of a violation “as shown by chemical analysis of the
substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the alleged
violation.” The Ohio Supreme Court has held that 4511.19(D)(1)(b) is a
rule of evidence not part of the definition of the offense.62 Most
importantly, putting aside the confusion surrounding the “working
tolerance” statute, the Alaska Court of Appeals has since held that the
phrase “as determined by a chemical test” does not make the test itself
determinative of the offense.63 For the few years that the court of appeals
held that the test was an element of the offense, this interpretation was
based on the “working tolerance” statute,64 not on the “as determined
by” language.65 A careful reading of the Alaska case law shows that a
breath test is evidence of a defendant’s actual breath alcohol level, and
this evidence, like any other evidence, is subject to attack. To understand
how the evidence-element confusion originated, and the current status
of the law in this regard, the next section will summarize the main
opinions on DUI law in Alaska over the past three decades.

defendant’s blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the
defendant’s blood, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the
following presumptions . . .”); City of Seattle v. Gellein, 768 P.2d 470 (Wash.
1989) (en banc).
60. 381 S.E.2d 11 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
61. Id. at 15.
62. State v. Mayl, 106 Ohio St. 3d 207, 210 (2005) (“Yet no matter under
which portion of R.C. 4511.19(A) a person is charged, the state has the
opportunity to offer the results of a ‘bodily substance’ test to show either
impairment—under (A)(1)(a)—or to show that the statutory concentrations of
alcohol or drugs have been exceeded—under (A)(1)(b) through (i) and (B). R.C.
4511.19(D)(1) discusses when these results may be admitted in a criminal
prosecution.”)
63. Conrad v. State, 54 P.3d 313, 314–15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (“We find no
indication that the Alaska Legislature . . . intended to shift the focus away from
the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of driving and to make the test
result determinative of the defendant’s guilt.”) superseded by statute, Act effective
July 1, 2004, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124 §§ 25, 27, as recognized in Valentine
v. State, 215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009).
64. ALASKA STAT. § 28.90.020(a) (2012).
65. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030 (2012).
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IV. THE CONVOLUTED HISTORY OF ALASKA’S DUI CASE LAW
Our story begins in 1976 with Lauderdale v. State.66 At that time, a
breath sample was captured in a glass ampoule and tested by passing
light through the ampoule.67 After testing Lauderdale’s sample, the State
either discarded or lost the ampoule.68 Lauderdale argued that he had
been denied due process because the government had destroyed
evidence and had not permitted him a chance to independently verify
the alleged results.69 The Alaska Supreme Court considered this issue so
important that it took the unusual step of hearing an appeal on the
suppression issue before entry of final judgment at trial, noting that “the
matter is of sufficient importance to justify deviation from the normal
appellate procedure.”70
The central holding of Lauderdale was that in a criminal prosecution
for DUI, a defendant must be able to “cross-examine the results of the
[breathalyzer] test.”71 As part of this right to examine the reliability of
the test, the supreme court ordered that a fundamental due process right
requires the state to preserve a sample of the breath for later testing.72
One source of a false test was if the ampoule itself had a defect which
could affect the testing. In this case, the test used only 10 randomly
selected ampoules out of an available lot of 10,000, pursuant to
regulatory requirements meant to help ensure quality of the sample.73
The court noted that testing only one ampoule per thousand for quality
was not much assurance of accuracy, and was “an additional argument
in favor of Lauderdale’s contention that he should be permitted to check
the specific ampoules used in his test.”74
Six years later, in Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano,75 the court of
appeals encountered a similar situation.76 However, rather than the
66. 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976).
67. See id. at 378–79 (describing ampoule breathalyzer process).
68. Id. at 381.
69. Id. at 380.
70. Id. at 378.
71. Id. at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 382. Subsequently the court held that due process was satisfied if
the police at least make a second test available to the defendant, and inform her
of the right to an independent test. See Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage,
792 P.2d 673, 676–77 (Alaska 1990) (“[I]t is not necessary to preserve a breath
sample in order to provide a defendant with a reasonable opportunity to obtain
an independent test. . . . [The state] also may provide this opportunity by
notifying a defendant of his right to an independent test and assisting [him] in
obtaining one.”).
73. Lauderdale, 548 P.2d at 380.
74. Id.
75. 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
76. See id. at 258 (“[T]he due process clause of the Alaska Constitution
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general Alaska statute the defendant was prosecuted under the
Anchorage statute, which provided:
A person commits the crime of driving while intoxicated if he
operates, drives or is in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle . . . when there is 0.10 grams or more of alcohol per 210
liters of his breath as determined by a chemical test within four
hours of his arrest . . . .”77
The phrase “as determined by a chemical test” had recently been
added to the statute, so the court was interpreting it for the first time.78
The Serrano court assumed that the phrase “as determined by a chemical
test” had not changed the elements of the offense, and that a defendant
had a clear right to challenge the accuracy of the test:
We conclude that due process does require the state and the
municipality to take reasonable steps to attempt to preserve
breath samples for defendants for their independent analysis or
to provide some other alternative check of the breathalyzer
results. . . . The ability of the defendant to “cross-examine”
these tests is critical to his case and to the integrity of the
criminal justice system.79
Thus the Court implicitly stated that “operat[ing] a car with a
certain level of blood or breath alcohol” was the element of the offense,
and the breath test result was critical evidence—but just evidence.80 In
the thirty years since Serrano, the Alaska Court of Appeals has never
changed its interpretation of the phrase “as determined by a chemical
test.”
After the Court’s order in Serrano, the State adopted a system
preserving breath samples in tubes.81 The breath sample was first tested
in the breathalyzer in use at the time, the Intoximeter 3000, and then the
air was captured in a magnesium perchlorate tube (“MPT”).82

requires the prosecution to make reasonable efforts to preserve a breath sample
or to take other steps to allow a defendant to verify the results of the
breathalyzer test.”).
77. Id. at 257 n.3 (emphasis added) (quoting ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE
9.28.020(B) (1981)).
78. See 649 P.2d at 257 n.3 (noting that the quoted language had been added
in 1981—this case came before the court in 1982).
79. Id. at 259.
80. Id. (“By making it an offense to operate a car with a certain level of blood
or breath alcohol, the current state statute and the city ordinance both place
great emphasis on the breath tests.”).
81. Best v. Municipality of Anchorage, 712 P.2d 892, 898–99 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985).
82. Id. at 899.
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Because the samples in the MPT could be preserved, it was possible
to test each sample repeatedly.83 The repeated testing, however, revealed
a large margin of error in the MPT method. For example, William
Walker registered an apparent .13 breath alcohol level on the
Intoximeter. The preserved sample was then tested four separate times
with apparent results of .071, .064, .094, and .063 (for an average of
.073).84 The preserved sample thus appeared to call into question the
Intoximeter result, but the MPT samples themselves were so diverse that
one could question how reliable these test results were. This system was
only used for about a year before it was abandoned, but during that year
dozens of criminal cases were dismissed because the retest results were
substantially lower than the Intoximeter results.85
In Best v. Municipality of Anchorage,86 Best argued that the entire
MPT system denied him due process because retests confirmed the
breathalyzer results only half the time, so there was no assurance of
accuracy.87 The trial court in Anchorage v. Hernandez, with which Best’s
case was consolidated,88 ruled that “to the extent that the [average]
results of the re-test are accurate within 15% of the Intoximeter, this
Court finds no basis on which to suppress the Intoximeter or re-test
results.”89 However, if the retest was off by more than 15% then the trial
court ordered the result suppressed as this showed the particular
Intoximeter result was unreliable.90
Wanting the trial court to go even further, Best argued that the
testing procedure was so flawed as to be virtually meaningless so no
MPT test results should be admissible.91 Because Best’s sample was
never retested, the trial judge refused to suppress Best’s Intoximeter
result, ruling that by failing to even have his sample retested he lacked
standing to make the argument.92 The court of appeals agreed with Best,

83. Id. at 902.
84. Id. at app. A (listing Intoximeter results).
85. See State v. Kerr, 712 P.2d 400, 404 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (explaining
that a three judge panel in Fairbanks dismissed forty DUI cases as a result of the
retest results).
86. Best, 712 P.2d at 892.
87. See id. at 893–94 (filing a motion to suppress Intoximeter results based on
Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion in Hernandez).
88. Id. at 898.
89. Id. at 893.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 894 (“[T]he essence of the [objection] was that there was no
need to have the tubes tested, because the procedures were so poor that the
results in an individual case were irrelevant.”). This seems to have been
essentially a due process argument.
92. Id. at 894.
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however, and vacated the trial court’s decision,93 explaining, “[i]f all
MPTs are so flawed that an accurate retest is impossible, it cannot be
said that those furnished MPTs have been furnished with a means of
either verifying or casting doubt upon a breath test result.”94
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court had erred in not
considering Best’s argument and remanded for further proceedings
clarifying the accuracy of the retesting procedure.95 Nevertheless, the
court’s ruling on the legal issue appears to be clear: the average retest
was within 15% of the Intoximeter only 50% of time, and whether a
particular defendant was guilty or innocent rested on a “purely
fortuitous” 50/50 chance.96 Thus, Best affirmed again that due process
requires a meaningful opportunity to challenge the accuracy of a breath
test result.97
To provide people this opportunity, the Alaska Supreme Court
addressed breath testing again in Champion v. Department of Public
Safety.98 Champion was another license revocation case deciding what the
state had to prove to revoke a person’s license.99 The language of the
civil revocation statute provided for license revocation when a chemical
test “produced a result described in AS 28.35.030(a)(2),” the criminal
DUI statute.100 The criminal statute provided that if there was 0.10 grams
or more of alcohol per 210 liters of the person’s breath, determined “by a
chemical test taken within four hours after the alleged operating or
driving,” then that person was guilty of driving while intoxicated.101 The
license revocation statute was thus ambiguous as to what the “result”
was. Champion held that revocation had to be based on the actual alcohol
level, not just the test result.102 This was because due process required
93. Id. at 896 (“Because we cannot affirm either on grounds of untimeliness
or lack of ‘standing,’ we remand this case to the trial court.”).
94. Id. at 895; see also id. at 896 (“Judge Andrews’ findings suggest that the
MPT system was at times working so poorly that whether or not a given MPT
result was close to the Intoximeter result was almost purely fortuitous.”).
95. Id. at 898.
96. Id. at 896.
97. Such an opportunity, according to the Alaska Supreme Court, has been
afforded people in custody through the voluntary drawing of blood. See
Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 687 (Alaska 1990)
(“[T]hat Gundersen was not given his choice of reasonable facilities at which to
take the test also did not deny him due process.”).
98. 721 P.2d 131 (Alaska 1986).
99. See id. at 132 (“Champion argues that the due process clause of the
Alaska Constitution requires the state to take reasonable steps to preserve the
breath sample or to provide some other means for the defendant in a license
revocation proceeding to independently verify the breath test results.”).
100. Id. at 131 n.1.
101. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (2009).
102. See Champion, 721 P.2d at 133 (“The ability of the defendant to evaluate
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that the civil defendant be given an opportunity to challenge the
accuracy of the test.
A year later in Barcott v. Department of Public Safety, Division of
Motor Vehicles,103 the Supreme Court again addressed a citizen’s right to
challenge breath test results. Barcott, after being pulled over, had a
breath alcohol content of .10 according to the breathalyzer being used,
the Intoximeter 3000.104 However, just prior to Barcott’s breath test, the
officer conducted two control tests using a sample with a known target
value of .103.105 The tests produced readings of .104 and .097,
respectively.106
At the time Barcott’s breath test was administered, the legal limit
was .10, leaving the test result right on the line.107 Because the two
control tests produced results .007 apart, it was clear that the machine
had some margin of error.108 The Court held that defendants in
administrative license revocation proceedings are entitled to challenge
the reliability and credibility of breath tests.109 As the smallest error in
his favor would have placed Barcott under .10, the Court held that this
margin of error was enough for Barcott to prevail.110
Barcott went on to hold that even in a license revocation
proceeding, the burden was on the State to prove the person was
actually above .10, factoring in potential margin of error.111 This made
clear that having a breath alcohol over .10 (or .08), not the test result
itself, was the element of the offense, and that as a matter of law, the
State could not prove breath alcohol to be above the legal limit when the
test result was within the procedure’s margin of error.112 Even more
relevant to the discussion of the “working tolerance” statute, Barcott
rejected the State’s argument that the legislature could prohibit
consideration of a margin of error.113 Thus, the Court seemed to hold
these [breath] tests is critical to his ability to present his case. To deny a driver a
reasonable opportunity to test the reliability and credibility of the breath test is
to deny him a meaningful and fundamentally fair hearing.”).
103. 741 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1987).
104. Id. at 227.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 229.
108. Id. at 227.
109. See id. at 228 (“The reasoning of Champion leads inescapably to the
conclusion that due process requires consideration of the margin of error
inherent in the breath testing procedure used in this case.”).
110. Id. at 229.
111. Id. at 230.
112. See id. at 229 (ruling in favor of Barcott when his tests were at the legal
limit because this evidence was not sufficient to prove breath alcohol at or over
the legal limit.)
113. See id. at 230 (“Champion mandates that the defendant in a license
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quite explicitly that the legislature cannot mandate that the results of a
chemical test be conclusively presumed accurate.
In Haynes v. State, Department of Public Safety,114 the Court again
addressed the due process right to challenge breath test results.115 While
it upheld the prior rulings guaranteeing that any margin of error must
be presumed to favor a defendant,116 the Court said that this was a due
process right the legislature could revoke in the context of a civil license
revocation proceeding.117
Thus, even though Haynes held that the inherent margin of error
must be imputed to the defendant in a license revocation proceeding,
the Court drew a distinction in dicta that would confuse the DUI
discussion for years to come. This distinction was between a statute
which makes an element of the offense testing above a per se limit as
opposed to actually having a blood alcohol level above a per se limit.118
Nevertheless, the idea that some states had made a test result the
element of a criminal offense was largely fictitious.119 Furthermore,
Haynes, like many of the cases cited to support the Court’s distinction,
was a civil license forfeiture case, not a criminal case. In Nugent v. Iowa

revocation proceeding has the constitutionally guaranteed right to challenge the
accuracy of the breath test independently. We have thus concluded that due
process will not allow the results of a chemical test authorized under AS
28.35.031(a) to be conclusively presumed accurate.”).
114. 865 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1993).
115. Id. at 756.
116. See id. (“[W]e hold that a chemical breath test reading or result which
may be reduced below the level of .10 grams per 210 liters of the person's breath,
by applying the margin of error inherent in the particular test used, cannot serve
as the basis for a license revocation . . . .”).
117. See id. at 755–56 (“The legislature has the power to require the revocation
of a driver's license on the basis of a particular test result or reading, despite its
inherent margin of error, when the legislature expressly considers that margin
and deems it sufficiently negligible such that it may be disregarded. . . . Absent
express legislative intent to the contrary, we hold that failure to apply the
inherent margin of error of a particular testing device in favor of the person
subject to license revocation violates due process of law as guaranteed by the
Alaska Constitution.") (Emphasis added) The Court never explicitly said that
the legislature could prohibit margin of error consideration in a criminal case.
118. See id. at 755 (citing Barcott, 741 P.2d at 229) (“In the course of our
analysis, we examined how courts in other jurisdictions interpreted their own
DWI statutes with regard to the issue of inherent margin of error in a chemical
blood/breath alcohol test.”). The court went on to compare states that
interpreted DWI statutes to create an offense upon a test reading in excess of the
statutory limit with states that require the fact finder to consider the inherent
margin of error in their decision. Id.
119. See People v. Mertz, 497 N.E.2d 657, 660–63 (N.Y. 1986) (examining case
law from many American jurisdictions and noting that no state in a criminal case
made a test result irrebuttable); see also State v. Scisney, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9605CC-00209, 1997 WL 634515 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 1997) (stating the same).
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Department of Transportation,120 cited by the Haynes Court,121 the Court
was careful to point out the different concerns between civil and
criminal cases considering blood-alcohol evidence.122
This difference between civil and criminal proceedings is vital
because of the different levels of proof necessary in the two types of
proceedings. Yet Haynes carelessly extended its holding in a civil case to
criminal cases by asserting that “[s]ome courts read their DWI statute . . .
to create an offense of registering a blood/breath alcohol test reading in
excess of the statutory limit.”123 Because Haynes was itself a license
revocation proceeding, citing those other cases was appropriate, but the
Court unfortunately suggested that doing so in a criminal case would
also be acceptable, erroneously saying that other states had done so.
Following the Court’s decision in Haynes, the State was required
under the breath alcohol theory of intoxication to submit evidence of a
breath test result of at least .110 because the .010 margin of error was
imputed in the defendant’s favor.124 In 1996, however, the Alaska
legislature adopted a statute stating that the “working tolerance” of an
instrument, or its margin of error, should no longer be considered in
either criminal or civil proceedings.125 Thus, while the adopted statute
appears to implicitly overrule Haynes’ central holding, Haynes’ legacy
120. 390 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Iowa 1986).
121. Haynes, 865 P.2d at 755.
122. See Nugent, 390 N.W.2d at 128 (“Plaintiff relies on several criminal, not
administrative, cases from other jurisdictions. Those decisions hold the state
must show a blood-alcohol concentration that takes into account the variance or
margin of error in order to support a criminal conviction. Although the issue
presented here does arise in the criminal context as shown by the above cases,
different concerns are addressed in civil administrative proceedings. Thus, the
criminal cases cited by plaintiff are not controlling in this situation.”); see also
Lara v. Tanaka, 924 P.2d 192, 195 (Hawaii 1996) (“[A] statistically significant
possibility that a driver’s actual BAC is below the legal limit does not overcome
the presumption of innocence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But we
cannot conclude that, because of that possibility, it is impossible to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a driver’s actual BAC exceeded the legal
limit.”).
123. Haynes, 865 P.2d at 758.
124. See Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 P.2d 427, 429 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1999) (“In essence, the Haynes decision required the State to introduce
an Intoximeter result of .11 percent or higher in order to prove a defendant
guilty of driving while intoxicated under [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.35.030(a)(2) or the
equivalent Anchorage municipal ordinance, [ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE §]
9.28.020(B)(2).”).
125. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.40.060 (1996) (“[I]f an offense described under
[Title 28] requires that a chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular
result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument
approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is
not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.”). This statute is now
ALASKA STAT. § 28.90.020 (2012).
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would continue because of the aforementioned confusion, conflating
civil and criminal cases.

V. MANGIAPANE AND BUSHNELL: THE COURT UPHOLDS THE
“WORKING TOLERANCE” STATUTE
In 1999 the Alaska Court of Appeals construed the “working
tolerance” statute for the first time in Mangiapane v. Municipality of
Anchorage.126 Mangiapane’s apparent breath test result was .112.127 He
requested an independent blood test, drawn 40 minutes later, with a
result of .10.128 Mangiapane’s breath sample of .112, even applying the
.010 margin of error in his favor, still would have resulted in guilt.129
Furthermore, guilt also could have potentially been shown from the
blood test result of .100.130 Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s
Haynes dicta, the Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he fact that the
driver’s true blood-alcohol or breath-alcohol level may be slightly lower
[than the Intoximeter’s reading] (due to the Intoximeter’s acknowledged
margin of error) is no longer relevant to the driver’s guilt under AS
28.35.030(a)(2).”131 The true alcohol level was irrelevant because the test
itself was thought to be the element of the offense; that is, at trial the
State only had to prove there was a test result of .100 or more.
This interpretation of the “working tolerance” statute was unusual.
On its face the provision that “the result described by statute is not
affected by the instrument’s working tolerance” seems to state a rule of
evidence. It does not appear to modify the elements of the offense in any
way which is defined in AS 28.35.030, and which had long been
established to make actual blood alcohol level an element of the offense,
and not the test result itself. Nor does the legislative history suggest that
there was intent to modify the elements of the criminal offense.132
126. Mangiapane, 974 P.2d at 427.
127. Id. at 428.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 429. Since the result was above the .11 percent Haynes threshold
required to prove a defendant guilty of DUI, adjusting for the margin of error
would still result in a breath test result over the legal limit.
130. Id. at 430 (“[ALASKA STAT. §] 28.40.060 effectively declares that a driver
violates [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.35.030(a)(2) if, within four hours of driving, the
driver is tested on a properly calibrated, properly functioning Intoximeter and
the driver's test result is at least .10 percent blood-alcohol or the equivalent .10
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.”) (emphasis in original).
131. Id.
132. The legislative history indicates that initially, the Working Tolerance
provision was not part of the bill, and H.B. 204 was directed at establishing
“zero tolerance” for underage drinking and driving, by making it an infraction
for an underage person to drive a vehicle with any alcohol whatsoever in her
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The “working tolerance” statute was discussed more thoroughly a
year after Mangiapane in Bushnell v. State.133 Unlike Mangiapane,
Bushnell’s apparent result of .109 put a legal reading within the known
margin of error.134
In light of Mangiapane’s holding, Bushnell did not attack
Mangiapane head-on but instead argued that the legislature had
unconstitutionally delegated too much power to the Department of
Public Safety (“DPS”) by allowing the DPS to determine the acceptable
margin of error.135 In other words, if the legislature says that the
working tolerance or margin of error cannot be considered and then
gives the executive branch authority to adopt any instrument or any
margin of error it chooses, then the legislature has effectively permitted
the executive branch to define the crime.
Bushnell began by quoting Haynes, claiming that the Supreme Court
had “indicated that the legislature had the power to base the offense of
DWI on a particular test result, and that a margin of error that it
considered ‘tolerably accurate’ could be disregarded.”136 The court then
concluded that since the legislature had the Intoximeter’s long history of
use in the State of Alaska as guidance,137 the legislature, by responding
to Haynes with AS 28.40.060, implicitly found that a working tolerance
of .01 percent of a properly calibrated instrument was “tolerably
inaccurate.”138
To put Mangiapane and Bushnell in perspective, it is worthwhile to
compare them to a New York case which presented almost exactly the
same issue. New York for the past three decades has had a law which is
similar to Alaska’s “working tolerance” statute. New York’s Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1195 [1] provides:
Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of actions
alleged to have been committed by any person arrested for a
system. See ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. 495 (Feb. 27, 1995) available at
www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_jrn_page.asp?session=19&bill=HB204&jrn=049
5&hse=H.
133. 5 P.3d 889 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
134. Id. at 890.
135. See id. (“Bushnell argues that [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.40.060 violates his due
process rights because it allows the Department of Public Safety to approve any
instrument, even one which is very inaccurate, to establish his level of
intoxication.”)
136. Id. at 891. As noted above, the Supreme Court in fact only said that the
legislature could base “license revocation” on a test result. Haynes, 865 P.2d at
755.
137. See id. (“When enacting [ALASKA STAT. §] 28.40.060, the legislature not
only had the Haynes decision for guidance, it also had the Intoximeter’s long
history of use in [the State of Alaska].”).
138. Id. at 892.
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violation of any subdivision of [Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1192], the court shall admit evidence of the amount of alcohol
or drugs in the defendant’s blood as shown by a test
administered pursuant to the provisions of [Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1194].139
While this language could be interpreted to require the evidence
only be considered “as shown by a test” result, the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Mertz140 ultimately held that such an interpretation
would be constitutionally problematic.141 New York’s highest court held
that “[e]vidence that a breathalyzer test administered within two hours
of arrest showed defendant to have such a BAC is sufficient to establish
a prima facie a violation . . . .”142 However, the Court continued that, it
was “error not to permit defendant’s attorney to argue on the basis of
evidence . . . from which it could be found that defendant’s BAC at the
time of the vehicle operation was less than .10% . . . .”143
Mertz was in an accident at approximately 2 A.M.144 He was taken
to the hospital and submitted two breath test samples to a
breathalyzer.145 The first “taken at 3:25 A.M. yielded a .15 reading. The
second, taken at 3:35 A.M., after the instrument had been purged,
recorded a reading of .16.”146 These results raised a number of disputes
between the prosecution and the defense. The first issue was which, if
any, of the tests was most accurate.147 The defense essentially wanted to
argue that the fact that the second test result was .010 higher ten minutes
later showed that the blood alcohol was rising rapidly and therefore
Mertz was most likely under the legal limit when he had driven the car
over an hour earlier.148 The State’s expert witness argued that it was
impossible to know if the two tests were both accurate; the variation
could have resulted “because not a deep enough sample was obtained at
the two different times or because one sample was longer than the
other.”149 Most defense attorneys would regard the state’s own expert

139. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (2012).
140. 497 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1986).
141. See id. at 662. (“To foreclose a defendant's introduction of evidence
seeking to establish that his BAC while operating was less than .10 may raise
doubt as to constitutionality.”).
142. Id. at 658.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 659 (discussing the presentations by the arresting officer and a
professor of physiology about the potential problems of each test).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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witness arguing for the uncertainty of the state’s evidence as a godsend.
But the trial judge precluded the defense from arguing either that the
tests were inaccurate, or that the tests were accurate and showed a rising
level of alcohol.150
The Mertz case raised a number of both statutory and constitutional
questions. First, the New York DUI statute provided: “No person shall
operate a motor vehicle while he has .10 of one per centum or more by
weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical analysis of his blood,
breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section
eleven hundred ninety-four of this chapter.”151 Thus the statute made it
an offense to have a blood or breath alcohol level of .100 “while driving”
but “as shown by” a later test. Other provisions permitted the chemical
test to be made “within two hours after such person has been placed
under arrest for any such violation” and further directed that the court
shall admit evidence of the amount of alcohol or drugs in the
defendant’s blood “as shown by” a test administered pursuant to the
provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. Thus the initial question of
statutory interpretation was simply: what is the element of the offense—
did the state need to prove .100 breath alcohol level at the time of
driving, at the time of testing, or merely show a test result at any time
within two hours?
The Court of Appeals held that the DUI statute defining the crime
in § 1192 as a breath alcohol level of .100 “while driving” had to be taken
at face value.152 Thus, the Court concluded that “[t]o foreclose a
defendant’s introduction of evidence seeking to establish that his BAC
while operating was less than .10 may raise doubt as to
constitutionality . . . .”153 As a result, defendant must be allowed to argue
the significance of such evidence, if it exists, to a jury.154
Obviously the New York Court of Appeals is not infallible and
Mertz is only persuasive precedent. Nevertheless, Mertz is the more
persuasive case. When a crime is defined in one section and another
section has a provision relating to admissibility of evidence, it is difficult
to read the evidentiary provision as anything but an evidentiary
150. See id. (“[W]hen defendant's attorney during summation began to argue
that it was fair to infer from the fact that defendant's BAC was rising at 3:35 that
at the earlier time when he was driving it was much lower, the Trial Judge
responded to the prosecutor's objection by stating in the presence of the jury that
the only question for the jury was whether the sample was taken within two
hours of arrest and showed a BAC in excess of .10.”).
151. Id. at 664 (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 2013))
(emphasis added).
152. Id. at 658.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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provision. As an evidentiary provision, it cannot create a non-rebuttable
presumption of accuracy and not violate due process.
More importantly, both the Alaska Court of Appeals and the
Alaska Supreme Court subsequently rejected the idea that the test result
was the element of the offense, but the ghost of Mangiapane has
continued to haunt Alaska by casting continued confusion over DUI
cases.

VI. THE RETREAT FROM MANGIAPANE
Three years after Mangiapane, the court of appeals again took up the
issue in Conrad v. State.155 While not explicitly overruling Mangiapane,
the court stated, “we did not speak carefully enough” in addressing the
issue in Mangiapane.156
Conrad was stopped by police and was later given a breathalyzer;
his sample registered over the per se level.157 Conrad argued that he had
not yet metabolized the alcohol while driving and was perfectly sober at
the time of driving; it was only much later that his breath alcohol level
had gone over the legal limit.158 Conrad did not dispute the apparent
accuracy of the test at the time it was given—he argued instead that the
test did not reflect his level of sobriety at the time he drove.
Obviously, if the element of the offense were simply a test result
above .080, then this defense could not work. But the Court in Conrad
unambiguously rejected the idea that the test result itself was the
element of the offense, explaining that they found “no indication that
the Alaska Legislature, either when it passed AS 28.35.030(a)(2) or when
it later passed AS 28.40.060 [the “working tolerance” statute], intended
to shift the focus away from the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the
time of driving and to make the test result determinative of the
defendant’s guilt.”159 Thus, the Court acknowledged that it used less
than perfect language in Mangiapane,160 and reaffirmed that a
defendant’s guilt “hinges on the defendant’s blood alcohol content at the
155. 54 P.3d 313 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (superseded by statute with respect
to the time of testing).
156. Id. at 314.
157. See id. (“[Conrad] submitted to an Intoximeter test; the test result was a
blood alcohol level of 0.154 percent.”).
158. See id. (“Conrad presented what he called the ‘big gulp’ defense: He
claimed that he had quickly consumed two beers just before he drove. Conrad
contended that even though his blood alcohol level was illegally high an hour or
so later after he was stopped, his blood alcohol level had been within legal limits
at the time he was driving.”).
159. Id. at 315.
160. See id. at 314 (stating, after referencing Mangiapane, that “[w]e now
conclude that we did not speak carefully enough”).
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time the defendant operated or controlled a motor vehicle.”161 Still,
while a breath test result is not conclusive regarding a defendant’s guilt,
it forms a presumption that a defendant may overcome by relevant
evidence.162 The Court’s opinion focused on the issue of “when” the per
se level must be proved, not on whether the test itself is an element of
the offense.163 Conrad did not solve everything, however—the Alaska
courts continued to say that some states made the test result itself an
element of the criminal offense.164
In 2008, the idea that a test result was an element of the offense was
explicitly rejected by Morris v. Department of Administration, Division of
Motor Vehicles,165 which noted: “The offense [of DUI] is committed when
either the blood alcohol level or the breath alcohol level is at or above .08
percent.”166
Morris was arrested and the Datamaster breath sample registered
.089.167 Morris requested a blood sample be drawn which was drawn
thirty-seven minutes after the breath test.168 The blood test result was
.070.169 Morris was apparently never criminally prosecuted, but the
Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his license anyway.170 Morris
argued at his administrative proceeding that his .070 blood sample
proved that his previous breath test result must have been erroneous.171
The hearing officer ruled that the .070 blood sample did not prove that
the .089 result was inaccurate and thus ruled that the state had proved
intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence.172
While the Supreme Court’s language in Morris at times used
ambiguous descriptions of what the state had to prove, the overall
discussion in Morris leaves no doubt that the state had to prove an actual
161. Id. at 315.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 313 (“[W]e conclude that the statute requires proof of the
defendant's blood alcohol level at the time the defendant operated or controlled a
motor vehicle.”) (emphasis added).
164. See id. at 315 n.7 (discussing other states’ statutes and their
interpretations of the test result, not the alcohol concentration at the time of
operating the vehicle).
165. 186 P.3d 575 (Alaska 2008).
166. Id. at 581.
167. Id. at 576.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 578.
172. See id. (“The department counters that substantial evidence supports the
hearing officer's determination that the breath test result was valid, that the
blood test result does not prove that the Datamaster breath test was unreliable or
inaccurate, and that Morris's blood test actually supports the hearing officer's
finding that Morris's blood alcohol content was over the legal limit.”).
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breath alcohol level and not just prove that there was a test result. First,
the Court reiterated the requirements of due process, stressing the
defendant’s ability to challenge an initial breath test result with an
additional test.173 If the State only had to prove that Morris had a test
result above .080, his other test result would have been completely
irrelevant. But the Court explicitly stated that the result was relevant,
concluding that “[w]hile an independent blood test result may have
significant bearing on the weight afforded a breath test’s reliability in a
given case, Morris has failed to provide sufficient support for his
proposition that in this case the hearing officer’s finding is not
supported by substantial evidence.”174 Indeed, the Court relied on the
blood test to conclude that Morris’s actual blood alcohol level was above
.080.175
The reasoning of the decision leaves no doubt that the trier of fact is
free to reject a breath test’s apparent result if the trier of fact believes the
result is not accurate. Indeed, the Court noted that “the weight given to
the breath test is a factual matter properly left to the hearing officer.”176
It stands to reason that the trier of fact in a criminal case has at least the
same discretion as the hearing officer.
In 2009, the Alaska Supreme Court returned to the issue of
challenging breath test results in Valentine v. State.177 Some of the
formulations in Valentine suggest that the test result is the element of the
offense,178 but when examined carefully it is clear that the Court did not
mean the decision to be read that way.179

173. See id. at 577–78 (“[W]hile [ALASKA STAT. § ] 28.35.033 creates a
presumption of the chemical test’s validity . . . [a] driver has the right to
challenge the accuracy of a breath alcohol test, which includes the right to obtain
evidence of an independent blood test producing an exculpatory result.”).
174. Id. at 582.
175. See id. (“Specifically, had the hearing officer assumed the accuracy of the
.070 percent blood test at 5:13 a.m., and extrapolated backwards in time using
the average rate of alcohol elimination of .018 percent per hour, Morris’s level of
intoxication would have been .081 percent at 4:36 a.m., the time of his chemical
breath test. Thus, his blood test result supports the conclusion that Morris was in
excess of the legal limit at the time of his breath test. . . .”).
176. Id. at 581.
177. 215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009).
178. See, e.g., id. at 323 (“Now, a person violates subsection (a)(2) if the person
takes a chemical test within four hours of operating or driving a motor vehicle
that yields a result of a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher, regardless
of the person's blood alcohol at the time of driving.”).
179. See, e.g., id. at 323–24 (“But in amending subsection (a)(2)'s bloodalcohol-level theory of the DUI offense, the legislature did not revise subsection
(a)(1)'s under-the-influence theory, which makes it a DUI offense to drive or
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or controlled
substances.”) (emphasis added).
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After being arrested, Valentine submitted to a breath test, “which
showed a blood alcohol level of 0.099 percent” and a later blood test
which “showed a blood alcohol level of 0.119 percent.”180 Interestingly,
it was not specified in a general verdict whether Valentine was
convicted under the blood-alcohol-level theory, the under-the-influence
theory, or both.181 The trial court refused to permit Valentine to present
evidence of consumption of alcohol before operating or driving because
since Conrad, the legislature had amended the statute to forbid the
introduction of such evidence.182 Thus, the trial court ultimately ruled
that the statute plainly forbade the introduction of such evidence under
either the blood-alcohol-level theory or the under-the-influence
theory.183
The Supreme Court reversed and held that insofar as the state
relied on the under-the-influence theory, due process required that
Valentine be permitted to present evidence that he was not under the
influence because he had not yet absorbed the alcohol into his system.184
The Court explained that “the legislature amended subsection (a)(2) to
redefine the blood-alcohol-level theory of the DUI offense in terms of a
defendant’s blood alcohol at the time that the defendant took a properly
administered chemical test rather than at the time of driving.”185 But the
Court also noted that the under-the-influence theory had not changed
and that theory required the State to prove the driver was actually
intoxicated at the time of driving.186 Accordingly, delayed absorption
evidence was relevant to show that the defendant was not intoxicated.187
180. Id. at 321.
181. Id. at 320.
182. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(s) (2012) (“In a prosecution under (a) of this
section . . . the consumption of alcohol before operating or driving may not be
used as a defense that the chemical test did not measure the blood alcohol at the
time of the operating or driving.”).
183. Valentine, 215 P.3d at 321 (“The effect of the district court's ruling was to
prohibit Valentine from offering evidence to show that even though his blood
alcohol level was above the legal limit at the time of his two chemical tests, he
was not guilty of driving while under the influence under either theory because
at the time he drove the alcohol he had consumed had not yet been fully
absorbed into his bloodstream.”).
184. See id. at 321 (“[D]efendants are denied due process if they are barred
from presenting delayed-absorption evidence in prosecutions relying on
chemical test results to prove that they are guilty of a DUI offense under
subsection (a)(1)'s under-the-influence theory.”).
185. Id. at 323.
186. See id. at 323–24 (“But in amending subsection (a)(2)'s blood-alcohollevel theory of the DUI offense, the legislature did not revise subsection (a)(1)'s
under-the-influence theory . . . .”).
187. See id. at 324–25 (“But the delayed-absorption defense is still relevant to
prosecutions under subsection (a)(1). A defendant's guilt in a DUI prosecution
under this subsection turns on whether the defendant was ‘under the influence’
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Additionally, the court of appeals’ decision (which was overturned
with respect to this one issue) noted the provision in the law that
“defendants may introduce evidence of how much alcohol they
consumed before driving to rebut or explain the results of the chemical
test—for instance, a defendant may offer evidence that he only had two
drinks before driving, and that the chemical test therefore must have
been inaccurate . . . . “188 The court of appeals went on to explain that the
statute did not create a conclusive presumption.189
Because this was not an issue the Supreme Court needed to
address, the Supreme Court did not do so, and this part of the court of
appeals’ decision was not overruled. The court of appeals’ decision is
clear that the courts were not reverting to the test itself as an element of
the offense.190
In September 2012 the Court of Appeals in McCarthy v. State191
unambiguously stated that Defendants have a broad right to present
evidence impeaching the accuracy of breath test results:
McCarthy was free to present admissible evidence impeaching
the accuracy of the breath test. He could have called the
while operating or driving a motor vehicle. If the government offers evidence of
the result of a properly administered chemical test after the defendant was
stopped, this evidence does not directly prove that the defendant was impaired
while driving because the chemical test result shows the percentage of alcohol in
the defendant's bloodstream at the time that the test was administered.”).
188. Valentine v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
189. See id. at 344 (“Under subsection (a)(2), it does not matter how
intoxicated the motorist was at the time of driving. What matters is whether the
motorist ingested enough alcohol before or while driving to have a blood alcohol
level at or above .08 percent at the time of a chemical test administered within four
hours of driving. The defendant may attack the accuracy of the chemical test, or show
that alcohol was consumed after driving. What he cannot offer is evidence to
show that the test did not measure his blood alcohol level at the time of driving
because the alcohol he consumed before or while driving had not been fully
absorbed—evidence that is no longer relevant under the amended statutes.”)
(emphasis added).
190. This is further illustrated by Judge Mannheimer’s partial dissent in the
Court of Appeals, which the Supreme Court embraced in its decision. As Judge
Mannheimer concluded, the prohibition in subsection (s) on delayed-absorption
evidence in prosecutions under subsection (a)(1) that rely on chemical test
results “unjustifiably prevents defendants from introducing evidence that is
both scientifically valid and directly relevant to the question of whether the
defendant was impaired by alcohol at the time of driving.” Valentine, 215 P.3d at
327. The dissenting opinion explained that “now, a person violates subsection
(a)(2) if they operate a motor vehicle and if, within four hours of their operation
of the vehicle, their blood alcohol level is .08 percent or higher, and if this blood
alcohol level is attributable to the person's voluntary consumption of alcoholic
beverages either before or during their operation of the vehicle.” Valentine, 155
P.3d at 349.
191. 285 P.3d 285 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
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authors of the calibration reports, or any other witness, to
explore the issue of the Datamaster’s accuracy. But that
evidence would go to the weight of the breath test result, not its
admissibility.192
The discussion of the issue in McCarthy seems to leave no doubt
that the breath test result is evidence of the offense and the defendant is
free to challenge the reliability of that evidence, and the jury is free to
weigh the value of the test evidence and reject it as inaccurate.
The Court went on to address the “working tolerance” issue,
although its ultimate resolution of the issue left open a lot of questions.
One of the issues raised by McCarthy was that the particular Datamaster
machine that tested his breath had consistently tested high by .004 to
.008, compared to the control sample.193 McCarthy argued that this
showed the instrument was unreliable so his apparent breath test result
of .214 percent was not reliable.194
The Court rejected this argument for a few reasons. First, the Court
made reference to the “working tolerance” statute explaining:
Under AS 28.90.020, a breath test result from a properly
calibrated instrument is not affected by the instrument’s testing
variations, as long as those variations are within the machine’s
working tolerance. In other words, the fact that the breath test
result may be higher or lower than the actual alcohol content of
the suspect’s blood is irrelevant so long as the machine is
functioning within the legally prescribed working tolerance.195
The above paragraph cited no authority and did not explain why
the “actual alcohol content of the suspect’s blood is irrelevant.” The
court appears to have been paraphrasing Mangiapane without citation, in
holding that evidence of an instrument consistently testing high was
irrelevant.196 But if the actual alcohol content of the suspect’s blood is
irrelevant, then why was McCarthy “free to present admissible evidence
impeaching the accuracy of the breath test,” presumably by showing
that his actual alcohol level was lower than the test result indicated?
The Court then went on to give an alternative basis for its holding,
raising yet more questions, explaining:
192. Id. at 290.
193. Id. at 287.
194. Id. at 292.
195. Id.
196. See Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 P.2d 427, 430 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1999) (“The fact that the driver’s true blood-alcohol or breath-alcohol
level may be slightly lower (due to the Intoximeter’s acknowledged margin of
error) is no longer relevant to the driver's guilt under AS 28.35.030(a)(2).”)
Mangiapane was not cited anywhere in McCarthy.
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The Datamaster’s calibration tests yielded only slight variations
from the norm: test results that were between .004-.008 percent
higher than the target values of the samples being tested.
McCarthy’s test result was .214 percent. Even if McCarthy’s
Datamaster was consistently high by as much as .008 percent,
McCarthy’s blood alcohol content would still have been
significantly over the legal limit (.08 percent).197
Clearly, in McCarthy’s case his subject sample was so high that an
instrument calibrated high by .008 would not have brought him within
the legal limit. But what about a defendant in the same circumstances
whose test result was .084, rather than .214? The Court’s opinion
implicitly acknowledges that in some cases a Datamaster that was high
by .008 percent would suggest that the person’s blood or breath alcohol
content is actually below the legal limit. Was the Court suggesting that a
defendant with a test result of .080 could present evidence that the
instrument “was consistently high by as much as .008 percent.”?
McCarthy gives no clear answer. On the one hand it affirms that a
defendant may impeach the accuracy of the breath test and “explore the
issue of the Datamaster’s accuracy,” while on the other hand asserting
that “the actual alcohol content of the suspect’s blood is irrelevant.”
The Court gave yet a third reason for rejecting McCarthy’s
argument, namely, inadequate briefing.198 This inadequate briefing is
likely one reason that the opinion seems to contradict itself in places.199
Moreover, McCarthy does not appear to have argued on appeal that the
working tolerance statute was unconstitutional, so the Court did not
address this issue.
To summarize McCarthy, and the current state of the Alaska
precedent, a test result is the evidence by which the state proves breath
alcohol content, and the breath test evidence may be challenged by any
other evidence—except evidence of the instrument’s margin of error.
Accordingly, looking at the whole gambit of decisions, it is clear
that the central premise of Mangiapane, that the test result is an element
of the criminal offense, has been rejected. So where does that leave us? Is
Haynes, which held that the margin of error must be applied in favor of a

197. McCarthy, 285 P.3d at 293.
198. Id. at 293.
199. Finally, it should be noted that the Court in McCarty conflates margin of
error with a calibration adjustment. A margin of error is a random deviation
plus or minus the true value. The facts in McCarty state that the instrument
consistently tested .004 to .008 above the target value. If an instrument
consistently tests .004 to .008 above the known target value it can be concluded
that it is calibrated approximately .006 too high, with a random deviation of plus
or minus .002.
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criminal defendant still good law? It would seem so. Mangiapane held
that Haynes had been superseded by statute, but since Mangiapane itself
has been repudiated, Haynes must be binding precedent.200
Setting aside whether the Haynes requirement that the margin of
error must be applied in favor of a defendant, it is very hard to imagine
a justification for not permitting a defendant to introduce such evidence.
Clearly it is relevant evidence, at least when the apparent breath sample
is at or near the legal limit. Given the Alaska Supreme Court’s repeated
emphasis on the due process right to challenge the accuracy of a breath
test how can a court prevent a defendant from contesting the accuracy of
a test with relevant, exculpatory evidence? As in Valentine where the
Supreme Court held that forbidding introduction of delayed absorption
evidence violated a defendant’s due process right to present a defense,
the “working tolerance” statute appears to do the same thing as the
delayed absorption statute.

VII. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE UNDER FEDERAL LAW
In Taylor v. Illinois,201 the Supreme Court asserted that “[f]ew rights
are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his
own defense. Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary
system itself.”202 At other times, however, the Court has emphasized the
power of the government to exclude evidence. The Court in Taylor went
on to note that “[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer
testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible
under standard rules of evidence.”203 And in 2006, the Court explained:
“‘[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the
Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal
trials.’”204 While the characterization of the right may have varied, the
Supreme Court is generally suspicious of any legislative attempts to
limit the admissibility of relevant evidence. The discretion of legislatures

200. Haynes clearly remains good law with respect to the “under the
influence” theory. ALASKA STAT. 28.90.020 purports to make margin of error
inadmissible under the “per se theory.” But what happens if the test result is
below .08, say .075? Suppose further that the state wants to submit evidence of
the apparent sample, along with other evidence, to argue that the person was
actually intoxicated. Because ALASKA STAT. 28.90.020 only applies to the per se
theory, it seems that a defendant must be permitted under Haynes to argue that
the margin of error should be assumed in his favor.
201. 484 U.S. 400 (1988)
202. Id. at 408 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
203. Id. at 410.
204. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (additional internal citations omitted)).
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in this area, the Court explains in Holmes, “has limits.”205
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never explicitly set out a
general rule to apply in all exculpatory evidence cases. Edward
Imwinkelried reads the bulk of Supreme Court cases as effectively
relying on a balancing test considering four factors: (1) “the availability
of alternative, admissible evidence”; (2) the reliability of the evidence,
(3) the probative value of the evidence, and (4) the importance of the
evidence to the defense.206
There are also a variety of specific limitations on a defendant’s
ability to present evidence. As the Court explained in Holmes:
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense
evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that
are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to
promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges
to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by
certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or potential to mislead the jury. Plainly referring to rules
of this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits
judges “to exclude evidence that is ‘repetitive . . ., only
marginally relevant’ or poses an undue risk of ‘harassment,
prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’”207
The first section of this article essentially considered the question of
relevancy. If, as discussed above, the state must prove that the DUI
defendant actually had a blood or breath alcohol level above a certain
point, then evidence calling into question the accuracy of the result is
relevant as it raises a doubt about the actual breath alcohol level.
The most common reason for excluding relevant evidence is when
it is unreliable. As one leading scholar in this area has put it: “The
accused in a criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to introduce
any favorable evidence, unless the state can demonstrate that it is so
inherently unreliable as to leave the trier of fact no rational basis for
evaluating its truth.”208 For example, the hearsay rules are intended to
exclude unreliable information. But even with hearsay, the Supreme
Court has held that due process takes precedence.209
The priority of due process concerns over evidentiary concerns
205. Id. at 324.
206. IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 4, at 54.
207. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326.
208. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. R. 71, 151–52
(1974–1975).
209. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that state
evidentiary rules cannot deprive criminal defendants of due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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with unreliability is especially important with respect to evidence that is
acquired or certified through scientific or quasi-scientific means.
Suppose, for example, a witness had no recollection of an event but
allegedly was able to recover memories under hypnosis. Courts have
struggled with whether such “recovered memory” is admissible, or
whether the witness even has “personal knowledge.”
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Rock v. Arkansas.210 The
Court noted a variety of problems with hypnotically induced memory,
noting that it frequently resulted in erroneous memories.211 The problem
in Rock, however, was that Arkansas had a per se rule forbidding all
testimony based on hypnotically recovered memory, and the witness
who wished to testify was the defendant himself.212 Thus the
defendant’s constitutional right to testify in his own defense was limited
by the statute. In holding that Rock’s constitutional right to present
evidence had been violated, the Court explained:
A State’s legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does
not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an
individual case. Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant’s
testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in the
absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity
of all post-hypnosis recollections.213
So while courts can exclude evidence which is unreliable, especially
pseudo-scientific evidence, Rock suggests that a defendant cannot be
prohibited from offering this evidence as a per se rule, but must be given
an opportunity to establish the reliability of the proffered evidence.214
More recently, in United States v. Scheffer,215 the Supreme Court
considered “whether Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes
polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-martial proceedings,
unconstitutionally abridges the right of accused members of the military
to present a defense.”216 The Court considered various reasons why
polygraph evidence might be excluded as unreliable, but ultimately
determined that exclusion was permissible because it did not preclude
the defendant from introducing direct factual evidence about the

210. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
211. Id. at 59–60.
212. See id. at 49–50.
213. Id. at 62.
214. Id. See also Patrick v. State, 750 S.W.2d 391 (1988) (holding that a statutory
prohibition on admission of portable breath test results could not prevent
defendant from using those results to help prove his innocence).
215. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
216. Id. at 305.
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offense.217 The defendant was prevented only from introducing expert
testimony to bolster his credibility.218
These cases suggest that Alaska’s “working tolerance” statute
might not survive constitutional scrutiny because it categorically
excludes factual evidence bearing directly on the offense. Is it plausible
to defend the “working tolerance” statute by claiming that it excludes
only speculative evidence? Arguably speculation about inaccurate breath
testing is not reliable enough to allow into evidence. For example, a
breath sample of .080 is equally likely to be too high and too low.219 This
places the fact-finder in the position of speculating, under the influence
of both prosecutor and defense counsel, as to the actual percentage.
This is one of the strongest arguments in favor of not admitting the
evidence; but while this argument may have force in a civil case, it has
much less force in a criminal case. In a civil case, where the burden of
proof is a preponderance of the evidence, it is acceptable to claim that a
test with a reasonable margin of error does not prevent the fact-finder
from rendering judgment with the appropriate level of certainty. But
when the burden is on the state to prove intoxication beyond a
reasonable doubt, the fact that a breath test might register high or low of
the actual mark places the ultimate issue in doubt. Moreover, prior to
Mangiapane, at least, the Alaska Courts regarded a known margin of
error as so well established as to be capable of judicial notice.220 Courts
to have addressed the margin of error seem to regard the fact that
breathalyzers have some margin of error as beyond dispute.221 Of
course, with reference to particular models of breathalyzer which do not
have a well-known or recognized margin of error, the court might
require a party to present evidence as to what the margin of error is.222
There are also limits to the admissibility of exculpatory evidence placed
217. See id. at 318.
218. Id.
219. This hypothetical assumes there is no other evidence of the amount of
alcohol consumed. And in some cases there may be evidence that the particular
machine is consistently registering high or low.
220. In Haynes the Court simply declared (without citation) that “[t]he
Intoximeter 3000 has a recognized margin of error of .01 grams per 210 liters of
breath.” 865 P. 2d 753, 754 (1993). See also Bushnell v. State, 5 P.3d 889, 891
(2000) (“[T]he Intoximeter’s working tolerance (or margin of error) of .01 percent
is likewise well-known”). Even Mangiapane referred to “the Intoximeter’s
acknowledged margin of error.” 974 P.2d 427, 430 (1999).
221. See Haynes, 865 P.2d at 755, and the cases cited there. The cases cited in
Haynes do not dispute whether there is a margin of error but only the legal
significance of this fact.
222. See, e.g., Borger v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 192 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1121–22
(2011) (holding that an expert’s “bald” assertion that the Intoxilyzer 5000 had a
margin of error of +/- .020 did not overcome the rebuttable presumption present
in a civil case that a test result of 0.08 percent or more establishes intoxication).
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on defendants by rules of procedure. For example, Taylor v. Illinois ruled
that a defendant could not present certain witnesses when defense
counsel refused to comply with discovery rules, explaining that
“[d]iscovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment
will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately
fabricated testimony.”223 For example, the Court noted that it was not a
violation of due process to refuse to permit expert testimony when the
defense refused to provide the prosecution with a copy of the expert’s
report.224 While Taylor thus permits the exclusion of certain exculpatory
evidence based on procedural violations, this holding affords no
protection for the form of exclusion at work in the Alaska “working
tolerance” statute. This case is noted because it again shows that the
right to present exculpatory evidence is not absolute. It also could come
into play in a DUI case, if, for example, the defense attempted to call an
expert witness without proper notice. The statute is not designed to
impose a procedural requirement. It is more like the per se exclusionary
rule deemed unconstitutional in Rock.225
The existence of a privilege or confidential information is another
potential basis for excluding relevant evidence, but the Alaska Supreme
Court has been hesitant to allow the prosecution to exclude evidence on
the basis of confidentiality.226
Courts have frequently found a violation of a defendant’s right to
due process or to confront witnesses when a state has restricted a
defendant’s ability to present evidence to the jury based on a state
privilege. In Davis v. Alaska,227 Davis wished to impeach a witness with
evidence of the witness’s juvenile conviction and probationary status.228
However, the trial court did not permit this line of questioning because
of a state law protecting the secrecy of juvenile convictions.229 The U.S.
Supreme Court, while acknowledging an important state interest in
maintaining the secrecy of juvenile records, held that restricting
defendant’s counsel from pursuing this line of questioning violated
Davis’s Sixth Amendment right to cross examination and a fair trial.230
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie231 also involved a dispute over the extent to
which a state could classify certain information as privileged and refuse
223. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1988).
224. Id. at 412 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975)).
225. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987).
226. See ALASKA R. EVID. 501 (limiting the privilege to refuse testimony only
to a limited number of explicitly enumerated cases).
227. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
228. Id. at 309.
229. Id. at 311–12.
230. Id. at 320.
231. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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to disclose it to the defense.232 Ritchie was charged with sexual abuse of
his daughter who had been interviewed by state social workers a
number of times.233 These social worker files were classified as
privileged under state law and the state refused to provide copies to the
defense even though the defense believed they might contain
exculpatory information.234 Again the Court stated that “the public
interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong,” but
held that the need for evidence in a criminal case outweighed this
interest.235
Confidentiality is relevant in the DUI context as well. There has
been an ongoing battle in many jurisdictions over whether the
prosecution must reveal the source code for breathalyzers to defense
counsel. This would enable defense counsel to have an expert analyze
the code and attack how the instruments calculate their results.236
Manufacturers have insisted that the source code is proprietary and
cannot be revealed.237
Putting that thorny issue aside, however, the argument that the
margin of error is confidential is dubious. Given that the Supreme Court
has held that even clearly confidential information such as the criminal
records of minors must give way to the defense right to present
evidence, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would be willing to
permit the state to conceal the margin of error on state breath testing
instruments.238 This argument does not appear to have ever been raised,
however, so courts have not decided the issue.
In conclusion, while there are a variety of exceptions which permit
courts to exclude relevant exculpatory evidence, those exceptions have
been narrowly drawn, and it is difficult to fit the “working tolerance”
232. Id. at 43–44.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 44.
235. Id. at 57. The Court did note that there were some limits to this access,
however, and decreed that the trial court should perform an in camera review of
the material, preventing the defense from having complete, unfiltered access to
the materials. Id. at 60.
236. For a helpful overview of this issue, see Aurora J. Wilson, Note, Discovery
of Breathalyzer Source Code in DUI Prosecutions, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 121
(2011).
237. See, e.g., State v. Kuhl, 741 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he
record is clear that the source code is not in the State’s possession and that the
manufacturer of the machine in question considers the source code to be a trade
secret and the proprietary information of the company.”).
238. One other theory that should perhaps be mentioned is that relevant
evidence can be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed
by undue prejudice. ALASKA R. EVID. 403. I have not seen this issue raised in any
DUI cases, and it is hard to imagine how evidence of margin of error could be
unduly prejudicial.
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statute into any of those exceptions.

VIII. IS THERE A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO HAVE A MARGIN OF
ERROR APPLIED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS?
The above sections have focused on whether a defendant has a
right to introduce evidence of the margin of error or uncertainties in the
testing procedure. This last section will address whether due process
requires that any margin of error be assumed in her favor.
The standard argument that the margin of error must be applied in
a defendant’s favor is that a reading within an acknowledged margin of
error is enough as a matter of law to create reasonable doubt regarding
whether the defendant was above the legal level. This argument gets
stronger the closer to the legally required percentage that a subject
sample is.239 This argument is based purely in the presumption of
innocence and the requirement that the state prove intoxication level
beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is a second argument that a conviction cannot be based on a
“purely fortuitous” result. In Best v. Municipality of Anchorage,240 the
Court of Appeals noted that the test results were so suspect that
conviction was based on the “purely fortuitous” result finding that the
MPT and Intoximeter results just happened to be close to each other.241
This argument has not been explored further in Alaska, however.242
Nonetheless, it can hardly be doubted that the right to be free from
arbitrary enforcement of the criminal law is even more important than
the right to vote. The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the fundamental
principle, stating that “[t]he due process guarantee protects citizens
from the arbitrary or fundamentally unfair use of government
power.”243 After all, whether an individual’s vote is counted is extremely
unlikely to have any effect on that individual, whereas the arbitrary
enforcement of criminal law may mean the difference between going
free or going to jail.

239. A subject sample at .080 has essentially a 50/50 chance that the next
sample will be above or below .080. As the number of subject samples increases,
the odds of one of those tests registering above the legal limit also increase.
240. 712 P.2d 892 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
241. Id. at 896.
242. The United States Supreme Court took up essentially the same issue in
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), which turned on whether there were sufficient
safeguards to ensure uniformity of vote counting, and held that due process
guarantees citizens the right to be free from arbitrary and disparate treatment in
the exercise of the fundamental right. Id. at 105.
243. Municipality of Anchorage v. Ray, 854 P.2d 740, 748 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993) (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 664 (2d ed. 1988)).
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Like the famous dimpled chads of Bush v. Gore,244 conviction and
incarceration in DUI cases where the defendant is close to the legal limit
depends on some degree of randomness. A person who blows into a
Datamaster and obtains a result of .080 might well have blown into the
machine a minute later and obtained a .079 result. Moreover,
Datamaster machines are only required to be calibrated to within an
acceptable working tolerance, which is plus or minus .010 of the known
test value.245 Datamaster machines also experience drift. So even if all of
the machines are initially calibrated perfectly, they may lose accuracy
over time. This means that a person blowing into several Datamaster
devices will have different results. A person blowing into two different
instruments one after the other could get subject samples differing by as
much as .020 based simply on instruments being calibrated
differently.246
This means that a person can be guilty of a crime if she blows into
one machine but not another. The difference between .079 and .080 is
entirely the result of a random fluctuations in 1) the machine’s margin of
error, 2) the differing breath samples of individuals, and 3) the
calibration of the particular machine. Any one of these three factors
could cause deviations away from the true measurement. When all three
are taken together they can result in large variations in test results
(typically assumed to be +/- .020).247 Thus relying on one simple test is
effectively random and arbitrary, because there is no certainty that the
single sample is accurate. Obviously, the closer one gets to the legal limit
the less confidence one can have in the result, but even apparent test
results well over the limit may still be the result of random fluctuations.
Most states have adopted a rule requiring duplicate tests to help prevent
the introduction of a random fluctuation. Conviction on a test result
close to the limit, especially within the acknowledged margin of error is
the criminal equivalent of a person’s freedom depending on the

244. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
245. Bushnell held that calibration to within plus or minus .010 is “tolerably
inaccurate.” 5 P.3d 889, 891 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
246. McCarthy v. State, 285 P.3d 285, 288 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012), held that an
instrument that consistently tested .008 higher than the target value of the
control sample was “within the acceptable margin of error set by law.” One
machine could be calibrated .008 high and another .008 low, so a person with an
actual breath alcohol level of .080 would have a result of .088 in the first device
and .072 in the other. Thus a defendant’s guilt or innocence could turn on the
purely fortuitous choice to blow into one instrument or the other.
247. See State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. App. Ct. 2012) (showing
sample readings of .131, .132, .119 and .121 and noting that this “variation in the
reading is common and expected”); see also infra at n. 269–94 (noting the number
of states that require two or more tests to be within .020).
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interpretation of a hanging chad.248
The only United States Supreme Court case directly to address the
due process concerns for breath alcohol testing was California v.
Trombetta249 in 1984. Trombetta argued that due process required that
the state preserve a breath sample for later testing, as a later test might
well be able to call into doubt the initial test results.250 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, noting that the procedures used by
California—two independent measurements closely correlated and
bracketed by blank tests—were sufficient to guarantee due process.251
While the Court did not explicitly say that one test would be insufficient
to guarantee due process, the Court’s emphasis on the process used in
the particular case (that is, two independent measurements which must
be closely correlated) at least suggests that two tests might be a
requirement of due process.252
As a general matter, the Supreme Court requires a balancing of
state and private interests to determine if the procedures used to deprive
a person of liberty or property are constitutionally adequate. As the
Court explained in Matthews v. Eldridge:253
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and, finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would

248. This argument is different than the claim that a single test is so uncertain
as to be inadmissible under the rules of evidence. This latter argument was
rejected in State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 1977). Dille had an
apparent blood sample of .226 and argued on simple admissibility grounds “that
it was insufficient to make only one analysis of defendant’s blood sample
because of the chance of error in any single test.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected the argument, explaining that the single test displayed sufficient
indicia of reliability to make it a candidate for jury consideration. See id.
Although it might be a preferred practice to run duplicate tests, the failure to do
so in this case was not a sufficient reason to exclude the test results. The
argument from Bush v. Gore is not about admissibility; it is that the admissible
evidence resulting from a single test within the known margin of error is
insufficient to support a conviction. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
249. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
250. Id. at 481.
251. Id. at 489.
252. See id.
253. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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entail.254
This general due process requirement is an additional argument in
favor of a duplicate testing. The risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty
when a person’s first breath test is at or just over the legal limit is
substantial. Even when the test result is well above the limit there is still
a possibility that the test result is an anomaly. Thus the probative value
of additional testing is significant. In contrast, the additional cost to the
state in having a subject tested twice—typically a five-minute process—
is negligible.255
The Colorado Supreme Court relied on this cost-benefit analysis to
hold that due process required either a second test or preservation of a
sample for independent testing.256 In 1979, Colorado had a regulation
much like Alaska’s which permitted a defendant to request a duplicate
blood test, but did not require a second test.257 However, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that this was insufficient to guarantee due process
and held that a suspect “must be given a separate sample of his breath at
the time of the test or the alcoholic content of his breath [must be
preserved] in a manner which will permit scientifically reliable
independent testing by the defendant.”258 The Court noted how
important a duplicate test could be for the defendant and stated that
“the cost of preserving and testing a separate sample of a defendant’s
breath is between three and four dollars.”259
The principal obstacle to adopting this line of reasoning into Alaska
law is the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Gunderson v. Municipality
of Anchorage.260 There, the Alaska Supreme Court did not engage in
cost/benefit analysis but held that if no breath sample is preserved,
“due process requires that [police] give clear and express notice of a
defendant’s right to an independent test and offer assistance in
obtaining one in order to introduce police-administered test results at

254. Id. at 334–35.
255. Garcia v. Dist. Court 21st Judicial Dist., 589 P.2d 924, 929 n.3 (Colo. 1979)
(estimating the additional of preserving an additional breath sample to be three
to four dollars) implicitly overruled on other grounds by California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479 (1984). The Datamaster used by the State of Alaska already has the
capacity to do duplicate breath testing simply by selecting “Number of Tests” on
the menu and entering “2.” BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING MANUAL, supra note 47, at
16.
256. Garcia, 589 P.2d at 929 n.3 (citing both the Colorado and U.S.
Constitutions).
257. Id. at 926.
258. Id. at 930.
259. Id. at 929 n.3.
260. Gunderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 677 (Alaska
1990).
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trial.”261
Gunderson is open to several criticisms. First, Gunderson relied on
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Trombetta when it stated that “the
chances are extremely low that preserved samples would have been
exculpatory” and “the high accuracy of the Intoxilyzer would mean that
a preserved breath sample would simply confirm the original test
result.”262 Yet the Alaska Supreme Court failed to note that this finding
was based on the specific procedure at issue in Trombetta, i.e., using two
independent breath tests within an acceptable range of each other.263
The second criticism of the opinion is that offered by Justice Burke
in his dissent to the Gunderson opinion.264 The majority noted that while
defendants had a right to an independent test, that right could be
waived if the police offered them the possibility of a second test.265 But
as Justice Burke pointed out, a waiver is a knowing and voluntary
relinquishment of a right.266 It is difficult to see a decision as a fullyinformed waiver when it is made in a split second, by a person in a
police station, who has been drinking, is tired, scared, in handcuffs,
knows nothing about alcohol testing, has had no chance to consult with
counsel, and may suspect that police are trying to trick him.267
There are several other reasons why Gunderson should be
reconsidered. First, the history of offering independent tests seems to
support the dissent’s case—although there are no published figures on
what percentage of suspects requests an independent test, the vast
majority end up waiving their rights.268 The fact that so few suspects
request a test suggests that suspects do not know what to make of it.
Another issue to keep in mind is that Gunderson was decided in
1990, before the enactment of the “working tolerance” statute. When
Gunderson was decided, any known margin of error had to be applied in
favor of the defendant. When the working tolerance is being credited to
the defendant the need for a second test is less important. But when the
margin of error is not applied in favor of the defendant, and the

261. Id.
262. Id. at 675 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 (1984)).
263. Gunderson, 792 P.2d at 675.
264. Id. at 678–79. (Burke, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 677 (“[W]e do not believe that having to make a choice while in
police custody so diminishes the value of the notice of the right to an
independent test that it makes it an unreasonable opportunity to challenge the
accuracy of the Intoximeter test result.”).
266. Id. at 678 (Burke, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 678-79 (Burke, J., dissenting).
268. In my own estimate, having handled more than one hundred DUI cases,
I would guess the percentage of defendants who request an independent test is
less than 10%.
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defendant is within the acknowledged margin of error, then a second
test is vital to an accurate determination of the breath alcohol level.
A third issue to consider is that a majority of states now require
multiple breath tests, and generally use the lower of the two tests. States
requiring two tests include Alabama,269 Arizona,270 California,271
Connecticut,272 Florida,273 Georgia,274 Idaho,275 Maine,276 Maryland,277
Massachusetts,278 Michigan,279 Nevada,280 New Mexico,281 North
Carolina,282 North Dakota,283 Oklahoma,284 Pennsylvania,285 Rhode
269. McDaniel v. State, 706 So.2d 1305, 1307 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (noting
that Alabama Administrative Code at Rule 370-1-1-.01(4)(a) provides that “Two
(2) samples of breath shall be tested. . . . Report the lower test result.”)
270. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1323(A)(3) (requiring duplicate breath
tests within .020 alcohol concentration of each other).
271. See People v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. 2002) (noting
requirement for two tests within .02); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 1221.4 (2013).
272. See REGS. CONN. STATE AGENCIES. § 14-227a-8b(c) (2013) (“Each time a
sample is analyzed by a device or instrument other than a direct breath alcohol
testing device or instrument, the analyst shall analyze duplicate samples.”).
273. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 11D-8.002(12) (2013) (requiring “a minimum of
two samples of breath collected within 15 minutes of each other, analyzed using
an approved breath test instrument, producing two results within 0.020
g/210L”).
274. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-392(a)(1)(B) (2012) (providing that “two
sequential breath samples shall be requested for the testing” and “the readings
shall not differ from each other by an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.020
grams and the lower of the two results shall be determinative for accusation and
indictment purposes and administrative license suspension purposes”).
275. Idaho procedure provides for two breath samples taken two minutes
apart and within .02 of each other. See IDAHO STATE POLICE, Idaho Standard
Operating Procedure, Breath Alcohol Testing, § 6.2 (Jan. 16, 2013) available at
http://isp.idaho.gov (prescribing multiple tests).
276. See State v. Kennedy, 657 A.2d 773, 774 (Maine 1995) (“[R]egulations
provide in part that a complete blood-alcohol test must consist of two separate
breath samples, the results of which are within .02% of each other . . . .”).
277. See Lowry v. State, 768 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. 2001) (“[A] test actually
consists of two breath samples in order to compare the samples to ensure that
the instrument is in proper working order.”).
278. See 501 CODE MASS. REGS. § 2.14 (2013) (requiring two breath samples
within +/- .020 of each other). The regulation further provides that “the lower of
the two breath sample results shall be truncated to two decimal places and
reported as the arrestee’s BAC.” Id.
279. See People v. Dinardo, 801 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (noting
collection of two breath samples is standard procedure).
280. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 484C.200 (2011) (requiring two tests within .020 of
each other).
281. See N.M. CODE R. § 7.33.2.15(B)(2) (2011) (requiring a good faith effort to
collect at least two breath samples).
282. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20–139.1(b3) (2011) (requiring testing of duplicate,
sequential samples).
283. See Koenig v. N.D. Dep’t of Trans., 696 N.W.2d 534, 535 (N.D. 2005)
(noting the requirement for duplicate breath samples).
284. See Childs v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 988 P.2d 898, 899 (Okla. 1999)
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Island,286 Texas,287 Washington,288 and Wisconsin.289 New Jersey and
Minnesota have gone so far as to require four separate and independent
breath test results.290 Other states have administered multiple breath
tests: Arkansas,291 Mississippi,292 New York,293 and Wyoming.294 While
many states have adopted these measures by statute or regulation, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court recently held that due process required
the state to collect and preserve a second breath sample when the state
collects a single breath sample.295
Vermont has a provision that a suspect must be offered a second
breath test and may “elect to have a second [breath] test administered
immediately after receiving the results of the first test.”296 In State v.
Lowe,297 the defendant’s first sample registered .083 and the second
registered .079. A second breath test may be more valuable to a
defendant than a blood test; for example, if a suspect’s blood test
registers .070 thirty minutes later, the trier of fact might conclude that
the difference is due to elimination of alcohol and still find the
(“In accordance with the Board’s regulations, a suspect driver's breath is tested
twice within a short period.”).
285. See 67 PA. CODE § 77.24(b) (2012) (requiring two breath samples within
.020).
286. See State v. Ensey, 881 A.2d 81, 85 (R.I. 2005) (describing the “two phase”
process by which two breath samples are collected).
287. See Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Manual, 52–53 (Randall
Beatty & Mac Cowen eds., 2001), available at www.txdps.state.tx.us/
CrimeLaboratory/documents/BATOperatorManual.pdf
(providing
for
duplicate testing); TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE § 724.012(a) (providing that an
arresting officer may require a suspect to submit “one or more” breath samples).
288. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.506(4)(a)(vi) (2012).
289. WISC. ADMIN. CODE § TRANS 311.06(3)(d) (requiring “[c]onsecutive breath
alcohol analysis results in a test sequence within .02”).
290. State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 131 (N.J. 2008); State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d
679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
291. See Hayden v. State, 286 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (noting
two tests).
292. See Parkman v. State, No. 2011-KM-00723-COA, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS
364, at *3 (Miss. Ct. App. June 19, 2012) (noting defendant submitted two
samples two minutes apart with the lower of the two used for prosecution).
293. People v. Mertz, 497 N.E.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. 1986). In New York some
localities appear to use duplicate testing.
294. See Peterson v. Wydot, 158 P.3d 706, 708 (Wyo. 2007) (noting the
defendant took two tests); Hwang v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 247 P.3d 861, 863
(Wyo. 2011) (noting two tests).
295. In re Opinion of Justices (Eliminating Requirement for Additional
Breath Samples), 2 A.3d 1102, 1105 (N.H. 2010). See also Ex parte Mayo, 652 So.2d
201, 205–06 (Ala. 1994) (holding that due process required the state to adopt
measures ensuring the accuracy of testing and stating that “administering two
breath tests” was one possible way of accomplishing that goal).
296. 23 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1202(d)(5) (2012).
297. 740 A.2d 348, 350 (Vt. 1999).
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defendant guilty.
Multiple test results were less common twenty years ago when
Gunderson was decided,298 but the prevalence of multiple testing around
the country and the widespread recognition that this is a more accurate
method argues that double testing has become a de facto due process
protection in a wide variety of jurisdictions. Numerous experts and
safety organizations, such as the National Safety Council, have called for
duplicate testing to ensure accuracy.299
The final change calling for a reconsideration of Gunderson is the
Bush v. Gore case, discussed above. As superseding precedent calls
Gunderson into doubt, the Court should consider the “working
tolerance” statute in light of Bush v. Gore.300

CONCLUSION
Given the fundamental right to introduce exculpatory evidence,
Alaska’s “working tolerance” statute is hard to justify and is outside the
mainstream. The issue of whether due process requires that the margin
of error be applied in favor of a defendant is a closer call. Given the
older Alaska precedents which held that this was a requirement of due
process, and given the decision in Bush v. Gore,301 there is a strong
argument that this margin must be assumed to benefit the defendant.
What is certain is that the Alaska courts have made a confusing tangle
out of this issue since Mangiapane. The Alaska Supreme Court has stated
that statutes restricting defendants’ right to present a defense must be
“closely scrutinized.”302 It is past time the Supreme Court reexamined
this issue and clarified the right to present exculpatory evidence in DUI
cases.
Finally, while this article has been phrased chiefly in terms of the
defendant’s right to present exculpatory evidence, a second breath test
may give the prosecution a stronger case. A person with an initial test
result of say, .081, may give a second result beneath .080, thus
potentially avoiding convicting an innocent person. But the second
298. While some states such as California have long had duplicate tests, one
treatise from 1995 indicates that duplicate testing was the exception in the early
1990s. EDWARD L. FIANDACH, HANDLING DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 13.20 (2nd ed.
1995) (“[A]ctual breath tests are rarely given in duplicate . . . .”).
299. See id. (“The National Safety Council has endorsed the practice, writing,
‘The test result reported in the case of breath analysis should be the mean of the
results of at least two separately collected breath specimens providing the
results agree with 10 percent of the mean value.’”).
300. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
301. Id.
302. State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 609 (Alaska 2007).
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result may give an even higher result, in which case the state will have a
much stronger case.303 A second test may be exculpatory or it may be
inculpatory, but in either case the jury will have better information upon
which to base a verdict, the defendant can be afforded due process, and
the adversarial system can be confident in a just result.

303. Jeanne Swartz, former head of Alaska’s Breath Alcohol Testing Program,
wrote in 2004: “Many states require defendants to provide two breath samples
within 0.020 of each other. It is very unlikely that an instrument would record
two samples within 0.020 or each other if the operator or instrument conducted
the test properly.” JEANE SWARTZ, BREATH TESTING FOR PROSECUTORS, 14 (APRI,
2004) available at http//www.ndaa.org/pdf/breath_testing_for_prosecutors.pdf.

